Production in Entrepreneurial Firms: The Effects of Financial Constraints on Labor and Capital
Introduction
Small entrepreneurial firms and larger companies have very different labor management policies.
One important distinction is that small firms are much more labor-intensive in their production processes. For example, the large firms in the Compustat data set in 1998 had a median total assetsemployee ratio of $189,628 while the median ratio for the small firms in the 1998 National Survey of Small Business Finance (NSSBF) was $18,520. 1 A second disparity is that survey and anecdotal evidence consistently show that entrepreneurial work environments are more cooperative. 2 What explains these different uses of labor in small and large firms? Is there a connection between small firms' heavy reliance on labor and their collaborative modes of production? In this paper, we argue that it is the financially constrained status of many small firms that drives both their relatively high employment levels and their enlistment of employee firm-specific investments.
We develop a model in which there are both constrained and unconstrained entrepreneurs.
Financially restricted firms must seek vendor financing from their suppliers. We presume that the supplier of labor (i.e., a worker) learns about the firm in the course of production, while the supplier of physical capital (e.g., a vendor or a bank leasing equipment to the entrepreneur) does not receive information until production is complete. The worker's ability to learn in the course of performing his duties enables him to exploit the real option to quit the firm if the entrepreneur's quality (e.g., the innovativeness of his project or the depth of his management skill) is revealed to be low. Workers are thus willing to join risky new businesses, even without an initial compensatory payment, because they will remain only with successful ventures. Suppliers of capital do not learn the entrepreneur's quality as quickly as workers do, and hence can only rent out their assets to firms with the resources to offer some fee in advance. Constrained firms' inability to offer their suppliers cash in advance thus leads them to make greater use of labor rather than capital in production.
We then demonstrate that even financially restricted firms that become successful find it hard to attract new employees (and thereby replace existing staff), and hence current workers can expect to receive a larger share of future firm profits in these firms. This has the implication that in a constrained firm a worker has incentives that are better aligned with the owner, with the result that the employee is more willing to make firm-specific investments. These investments benefit the firm such that constrained firms will exhibit strong performance early in their lives. Unconstrained 1 The Compustat firms had a median of 600 employees, while the NSSBF firms had a median of 5 employees. 2 Examples include Wilkinson (1999) and "Nine to Five -No Comparison: Having worked for both large and small companies, These executives have come to the same conclusion: Small is better," Wall Street Journal, May 22, 1997, p. R.10. 1 firms, however, benefit as they age from their ability to replace low quality workers. Our model thus predicts that the labor productivity of financially constrained firms relative to unconstrained firms will decrease over time.
We test several of the implications of the model. Measuring the effects of financial constraints on a firm's production and employment strategies requires a reasonable proxy for having limited access to credit. Using data from the 1998 National Survey of Small Business Finance, we analyze the owner and firm characteristics that are associated with loan rejections and then consider the capital-labor ratios of firms that are more likely to have loan applications denied. We do not simply regress capital-labor ratios on whether a firm's application was denied, because firms with little capital to serve as collateral might be more likely to be rejected, thereby generating an endogenous relationship. Instead we show that local bank concentration, the owner's home equity, net worth, and ethnic status, and the firm's credit score are all good predictors of bank loan application rejection and hence serve as good instruments for financial constraints. We then show, in a twostage least squares analysis, that the instruments for bank loan rejection are associated with low capital-labor ratios, controlling for firm size, age and industry, as predicted by our theory.
We further test the implication of the model that the relative productivity of constrained firms will decrease with firm age. This is confirmed in empirical results that show that financially restricted firms experience slower productivity growth, controlling for the level and type of assets and the number of employees in the firm. We also provide evidence, using data from the [1996] [1997] National Organizations Survey, that is consistent with our theoretical prediction that workers in constrained firms are more likely to make firm-specific investments.
Our theory and empirical work suggest that financial constraints can have a substantial impact on the investment decisions and growth trajectories of entrepreneurial firms. Small firms (those with fewer than 500 employees) are responsible for roughly 58 percent of U.S. private employment (Headd (2000) ) and 50 percent of private, nonfarm GDP (Joel Popkin and Company (2001) ).
Given this importance, their strategies for setting employment levels and deploying capital have crucial implications for the overall allocation and organization of human and physical capital in the economy.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 provides a literature review. We introduce the basic model in Section 2 and provide results on the optimal capital-labor choices of financially constrained and unconstrained firms. In Section 3 we extend the model to analyze the effects of financial constraints on the firm-specific investment decisions made by employees, and we examine 2 the relative productivities of constrained and unconstrained firms over time. Section 4 describes empirical tests that examine the relationship between financial constraints and capital-labor ratios and productivity growth. In Section 5 we provide empirical work linking financial constraints to firm-specific investments by workers. We conclude the paper in Section 6. Formal proofs of the results are given in the Appendix.
Literature Review
Our work relates to several different streams of the literature. Hanka (1998) , Ofek (1993) , Kang and Shivdasani (1997) and Bronars and Deere (1991) link firms' capital structures to their labor negotiations strategies and firing policies. The thrust of these papers is that firms with substantial debt facing severe financial constraints lay off workers more frequently. The capital-labor decision is not the focus of this work. Michelacci and Quadrini (2005) relate financial constraints to employee wages and claim, as we do, that employees can be a good source of financing for constrained firms. They do not, however, study the informational advantage of labor over physical capital, and we show that financially constrained firms will grow more slowly, while Michelacci and Quadrini argue the opposite. In our empirical work we present an explicit measure of financial constraints and find evidence consistent with our theory.
Peek and Rosengren (2000), Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) , Klein, Peek, and Rosengren (2002) and Burgess and Pande (2003) , in work on financial market imperfections, have emphasized the broad damage that poorly functioning national or local credit markets can cause to investment and growth. We study how financial constraints can distort one particular investment decision, the capital-labor choice, and, extending this approach, we provide a theoretical analysis of the costs of financial constraints. Eisfeldt and Rampini (2005a,b) show that constraints can influence the type of capital used by a firm. These papers demonstrate that constrained firms exhibit preferences for used capital (versus new) and for leasing (rather than buying). Several previous studies have explored the effects of the financing environment on the success of entrepreneurial firms and evaluated the comparative advantages of bank and venture capital finance (Black and Strahan, 2002 , Black and Gilson, 1998 , Ueda, 2004 and Inderst and Muller, 2004 These studies consider aspects of the capital choices made by firms. Our central focus is on the optimal labor/capital strategies for firms to undertake, given that they find it difficult to obtain credit.
3
Our paper complements other work that considers both the labor and the capital strategies of firms. Several studies show that production in small firms is typically less capital intensive (Oi (1983) , Kimura (2001) and Dupuy and de Grip (2003) ). Small firms are more likely constrained than their larger counterparts, so these findings relate to our argument that financially restricted firms employ less capital. Our empirical work, however, studies the effects of financial constraints on investment and growth, with the analysis controlling for firm size.
Theoretical Model

Model Setup
We begin by describing the setup of the model.
Production in a Firm
We model an entrepreneur with a new business idea. Production takes place over two periods, and it requires either labor or physical capital, which we will assume for simplicity to be perfect substitutes. The entrepreneur chooses the mode of production (labor or capital) prior to the beginning of each period. The idea of the entrepreneur and the input are then used to generate output.
The productiveness of the firm (as determined by the quality of the entrepreneur's idea or management skill) is given by f . If labor is hired, the quality of the match between the labor and the firm is q. If capital is hired or purchased, the quality of the match between the capital and the firm is r. For convenience we assume that f , q and r are positive random variables with full support over some bounded intervals. Total firm output π in a period is given by
The entrepreneur must secure an input supplier for the second period before the first period production is complete. At the conclusion of second period production, the business is closed down and all assets have no further value. For simplicity, we set the discount rate equal to zero.
The Informational Advantage of Labor
The key distinction between labor and capital in the model is that the supplier of labor (i.e. a worker) is capable of learning about the firm in the course of production, while the supplier of capital (e.g. someone leasing a piece of machinery to the entrepreneur) does not receive information until 4 production is complete. Before the first period, the entrepreneur and the suppliers of labor and capital are equally ignorant of their specific qualities. In the course of the first period production, prior to the point at which second period arrangements must be made, however, f and either q or r (depending on whether labor or capital is hired) are revealed to the entrepreneur. If labor is hired, the worker also views f and q before making a decision about the second period. If, however, capital is hired, the supplier of capital only views f and r when first period production is complete, after second period arrangements have been finalized.
Inputs: Hiring or Purchasing
We assume for realism that labor may be hired, but capital may be either purchased or rented. 3
Hiring (or renting) the input differs from purchasing it in two ways. First, if the input is hired, either party may terminate the relationship at the end of the first period. Purchased capital, on the other hand, belongs to the entrepreneur for as long as he wishes. Second, if the capital is purchased, all output belongs to the entrepreneur. If, on the contrary, the labor or capital input is hired, the supplier of the input acquires some bargaining power over the entrepreneur; we will assume that the output is not verifiable, so contracting is not possible and bargaining takes place over the division of the non-verifiable output. 4
Since both the input and the entrepreneur are necessary for production, we will assume, as is standard in the incomplete contracting literature (e.g. Hart and Moore, 1994) , that the entrepreneur receives a fraction 1 − θ of the output, where θ ∈ (0, 1), with the remainder going to the input supplier (Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky, 1986) . Both labor and capital have opportunity costs, which we denote by > 0 for labor and ζ > 0 for capital. Any labor or capital not employed by the entrepreneur in a given period receives its opportunity cost as payoff that period. Capital may be purchased or sold for 2ζ before the first period and for ζ before the second period.
We assume that the entrepreneurial venture is risky and, on average, not profitable 5 for the suppliers of the inputs (see, for example, Hamilton (2000) , Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) and Audretsch (1991) ). We assume that
and θ f +r < ζ,
where we denote the mean of a variable x byx.
Second-period Input Supply
If the relationship between the entrepreneur and the input supplier is terminated in the first period, the entrepreneur may seek a new input for second period production. All outsiders (those who have not participated in the firm) observe the age of the firm and whether any separations have occurred.
Outsiders, however, cannot distinguish between separations initiated by the entrepreneur and those initiated by the input supplier (Lane, Isaac and Stevens (1996) ).
Constrained and Unconstrained Entrepreneurs
We distinguish between two types of entrepreneurs. Financially constrained entrepreneurs have no wealth with which to pay suppliers of capital or labor. Financially unconstrained entrepreneurs have limitless wealth at their disposal and may offer advance payments to input suppliers. We assume that the financial status of an entrepreneur is public knowledge. 6
The timing of the model is summarized in Figure 1 .
Results: The Capital-Labor Decision and Financial Constraints
We now consider differences in the capital-labor decisions of constrained and unconstrained entrepreneurs. We seek Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of the game described above. (All subsequent references to equilibria are to Perfect Bayesian equilibria.) 
A proof of Result 1 is given in the Appendix.
It is clear that the purchase of capital is outside the means of the constrained entrepreneur, but Result 1 shows that constrained firms cannot rent capital either. The intuition for the result is as follows. Suppose that a constrained entrepreneur could rent capital in the first period. Capital suppliers do not observe firm quality, so if a firm separates from its first-period capital supplier it is deemed to be an average quality firm by the market (i.e., the separation conveys no information).
Assumption (3), that the one-period average returns to capital are less than the reservation rental price, implies that no supplier will be willing to offer new capital to a firm in the second period without an advance payment, which the constrained firm cannot offer. As a result, constrained entrepreneurs who rent capital in the first period will always retain the capital for both periods.
Assumption (3) then shows that first-period suppliers of capital will not earn their reservation payoffs over the two periods. It must therefore be that capital can only be rented with an advance charge, which implies that constrained entrepreneurs cannot rent capital in equilibrium.
Why can constrained firms hire labor? Labor differs from capital in that the first-period employees can observe the firm's quality f and the quality q of their labor match before making second-period arrangements. If the sum of the firm and labor match qualities is too low, then the employee will leave the firm. This real option to only remain with a successful venture enhances the two-period payoff of labor hired in the first period from 2θ(f +q) to
and if (4) holds, then constrained firms can hire labor with no initial signing payment. The basic intuition is that a worker may be willing to essentially finance the firm by accepting low initial wages, because if he learns that the entrepreneur is of poor quality then he can simply leave. The ability of workers to learn about a firm's prospects and hence remain only with successful ventures generates a real option that enables them to join risky new businesses, even without an initial compensatory payment. Suppliers of capital do not learn as quickly as workers do, and hence can only rent out their assets to firms with the ability to offer some fee in advance.
Result 2 shows that unconstrained entrepreneurs may hire capital. A proof of Result 2 is given in the Appendix.
Unconstrained entrepreneurs have sufficient cash to simply buy physical capital when that is the input they prefer. Unconstrained entrepreneurs do not need financing, so their choice of input is thus solely governed by the productivities and costs of labor and capital, without reference to the fact that labor may be rented without an advance payment.
While in practice the differences between the two entrepreneurs will not be quite as stark as depicted in the theoretical findings, the clear empirical implication of Results 1 and 2 is that constrained firms will rely more heavily on labor while unconstrained firms will make more use of capital. We will test this prediction in Section 4.
3 Model Extension: Firm-Specific Investments and Growth
Model Extension Setup
We now introduce a more comprehensive model of labor production that allows for an analysis of firm-specific investment by the worker. As our focus in this section will be on the strategy of the worker, we will analyze the case in which both constrained and unconstrained entrepreneurs hire labor, not capital. (It is sufficient, for example, to assume that the conditions given in the proofs of Results 1 and 2 for labor-hiring equilibria hold.)
Each period, after having viewed the firm and labor match qualities, the worker decides whether or not to make a firm-specific investment. This investment requires some effort by the worker, in exchange for which he becomes more productive within the firm. For example, the employee may exert himself to master the firm's internal systems. This skill enables the employee to produce more while working with the entrepreneur but does not increase his value to other employers.
We presume that if the employee exerts effort, he pays a personal cost of g, and the quality of his labor match permanently improves from q to q + λ. If the worker fails to exert effort, no gains are realized. We assume that firm-specific investment is essentially a long-term investment; it is only profitable to the worker when he expects to enjoy the benefits over both periods. Specifically,
and 2θλ > g.
The timing of the extended model (for the case of the labor-hiring equilibrium) is summarized in Figure 2 .
Results: Firm-specific Investment, Growth and Financial Constraints
We now describe the equilibrium firm-specific investment decisions of workers in constrained and unconstrained firms and analyze the impact of these choices on firm growth.
The second period firm-specific investment decision of the worker is straightforward. Inequality (5) shows that the optimal second-period strategy for workers at both constrained and unconstrained firms is to not exert effort.
In the first period, a worker will be willing to make a firm-specific investment only if he expects to be retained in the second period, and if he expects to reap some benefit from the investment in the second period. Lemma 1 gives a condition under which a constrained entrepreneur will retain a worker.
Lemma 1. If worker qualityq at the end of the first period satisfies
then the worker will be retained by a constrained entrepreneur.
A proof of Lemma 1 is given in the Appendix.
The following is the intuition for Lemma 1. If a constrained firm seeks a new worker after the first period, this is regarded as a weakly negative signal about the firm by the market, because the first-period separation may have arisen from a firing or a quitting (or both), and none of these indicates good news about the firm. Condition (2), that even average firms insufficiently compensate employees, thus guarantees that no new worker will join the constrained firm without an advance payment, which the firm cannot provide. As a consequence, whenever the firm is able to retain its first period employee (i.e., whenever (7) holds), it will do so. This generates an implicit retention guarantee for employees of successful constrained firms.
We emphasize that the overall probability of retention need not be higher in constrained firms.
Constrained firms may be forced, due to lack of resources or complete firm failure, to lay off their employees. When (7) fails, only unconstrained entrepreneurs can retain their employees. The essential point is that when the firm is successful (i.e., when (7) holds), constrained firms are more likely to retain their employees than unconstrained firms, but the opposite is true when the firm is struggling.
Result 3. If a worker in an unconstrained firm makes a firm-specific investment, then a worker in a constrained firm makes a firm-specific investment. The converse does not hold.
Retention alone is not sufficient to induce the worker to exert effort; he must also realize a benefit from his effort to improve his productivity. If (7) fails, the worker may quit, be fired or offered a retention payment to stay, but in all cases he will simply receive a net payment of his reservation value . Employees do not benefit from being retained by poorly-performing firms, and the prospect of being retained by such a firm will not encourage them to make a firm-specific investment. If (7) holds, the worker will receive a share of the output that he has increased. It is thus an implication of Lemma 1 that constrained firms retain workers precisely when it is in the interest of the workers to make firm-specific investments, and workers understand this. The practice of retention by successful constrained firms is the reason that entrepreneur and worker incentives are better aligned in constrained, rather than unconstrained firms, despite the greater survival probability of the latter. As a consequence, Result 3 predicts that workers should be more willing to invest in skills specific to the firm when working for financially restricted entrepreneurs.
Result 3 shows that successful constrained entrepreneurs induce employee investment in their firms by offering implicit retention guarantees to workers. Constrained entrepreneurs, however, also suffer from the fact that they cannot dismiss poor quality workers. This argument suggests that constrained entrepreneurs will have relatively high first-period output (due to firm-specific investments by workers) but relatively low second-period output (because they have lower quality workers). Result 4 formalizes this idea. We denote the constrained firm's output in period i = 1, 2
by π i,c , and π i,u is defined similarly for unconstrained firms.
Result 4. Constrained firms experience relatively high first-period output and relatively low second-period output:
Moreover, conditional on first-period output, unconstrained firms have higher expected secondperiod output than constrained firms. Formally, for all x ≥ 0,
Result 4 states that constrained firms will have lower output growth than unconstrained firms.
In the model, the firm's assets and number of employees do not vary over time, so Result 4 essentially predicts lower labor productivity growth for constrained firms. This result complements some of the findings in the literature that link financial constraints to slower growth due to reduced physical capital investment (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998 , Carlin and Mayer, 2003 and Almeida and Campello, 2005 . In contrast, Result 4 focuses on human capital: constrained firms benefit from greater firm-specific investment by their workers, but gradually suffer from a negative selection effect in the quality of their employees that arises from their limited ability to fire. Result 4 predicts that constrained firms will perform relatively well early in their lives and relatively poorly later for reasons that are completely independent of their physical capital investment policies. 7
Robustness
We now consider the effects on the theory's implications of relaxing several modelling assumptions.
Correlation between firm quality and financial status
One possible extension to the model would be to allow for positive correlation between firm quality f and unconstrained status. That is, better entrepreneurs may be wealthier. In this case, ability to pay input suppliers in the second period would now signal firm quality f and the relative advantage of unconstrained entrepreneurs in second period hiring described in the base model would be enhanced. Since this relative hiring advantage drives the results, the main findings of the paper would continue to hold.
First-period payoffs realized before inputs secured for second period
A second possible extension would be to have first-period payoffs realized by the entrepreneur before second period arrangements are made. In such a setting, some very successful constrained firms would switch to unconstrained status, which would moderate the distinction between initially constrained and unconstrained entrepreneurs. Nonetheless, ability to pay in the second period would signal firm quality in this extension as well, and the relative hiring advantage of unconstrained entrepreneurs would be maintained. Thus, the central implications of the paper are robust to this extension as well.
Financial status is private information
A third extension would require that financial status be unknown to potential investors and employees. A pooling equilibrium in which all entrepreneurs rent capital would require that no initial payments for capital be made (because the constrained cannot make these payments), but the argument underlying Result 1 indicates that such an equilibrium cannot exist. As a result, constrained entrepreneurs would be unable to rent capital in this model as well, and Results 1 and 2 would continue to hold. Results 3 and 4, however, do require that employees be informed about the financial status of the entrepreneur when making their firm-specific investment decisions. Results 3 and 4 thus require that employees be able to learn about the entrepreneur's financial condition in the course of employment. Results 1 and 2 are robust to this assumption, as well.
Complete contracts
A final variation on the base model would be to allow for full verifiability of firm cash flows and complete contracts. For example, the employee could be offered a fixed or contingent wage, and the physical capital supplier might be awarded a debt or equity claim. This variation would have little effect on the capital-labor decision analyzed in Section 2. The central issues in that section are the information disadvantage of capital relative to labor and the desire of the entrepreneur to continue the project even if it not profitable for the input supplier. An unconstrained entrepreneur can always purchase capital, while a constrained entrepreneur will be unable to rent capital, irrespective of the contract he offers, because the project is on average not worthwhile. A worker, by contrast, may join a constrained firm because of his ability to leave if project quality is revealed to be low.
The verifiability of cash flows would, however, affect Results 3 and 4. The intuition for these results is that financially constrained status essentially serves as a commitment device on the part of the entrepreneur to retain the worker because successful constrained entrepreneurs do not replace their employees, while successful unconstrained entrepreneurs may do so. This implicit commitment to retain their employees induces them to invest in the firm in the first period. In the presence of verifiable cash flows, however, contracts may be used by unconstrained entrepreneurs to make an explicit retention promise. This suggests that the model of firm-specific investment described in Section 3 is most appropriate for firms in which cash flows are quite costly or hard to verify. This condition is likely to apply to many entrepreneurial ventures for which the use of external cash flow 12 monitors is simply impractical. 8
Empirical Tests: Capital-Labor Ratios, Productivity Growth and Financial Constraints
In this section we provide empirical tests of Results 1, 2 and 4. Section 5 provides tests of Result 3.
Data
Our data source for these tests is the 1998 National Survey of Small Business Finance (NSSBF)
conducted by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. This survey, which has been used by a number of researchers (e.g. Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) and Petersen and Rajan (2002)) collects information on owner demographics, financing characteristics, balance sheets and other attributes of small businesses (which are defined to be firms with fewer than 500 employees).
There are 3,561 U.S. firms in the data set. Firms report the book value of assets and the number of employees they hire. The value of assets includes capital that is rented in the form of capitalized leases or secured with collateralized loans but excludes operating leases. Data are also provided on sales revenue, the total cost of conducting business, profit margin (i.e., profits divided by sales), firm age, the Dun and Bradstreet firm credit score (a 1-5 scale) and whether the firm is located in an MSA (Metropolitan Statistical Area). A bank competition index from one to three is given that describes the commercial bank deposit Herfindahl measure of the firm's MSA (if it is in an MSA) or county. (The firm's location, however, is not revealed.) The firms also report financial information including whether their most recent loan application was rejected and whether they have applied for a loan in the last three years.
Detailed data on the owner is provided, such as the value of home equity, net wealth (excluding both home equity and the value of the firm), ethnicity, gender and education (on a 1-7 scale). The 52 firms with zero sales, the 7 firms with negative asset levels and the 1 firm without a reported bank Herfindahl index are excluded from the data set. Summary statistics including means (all variables) and medians and standard deviations (all non-binary variables) are given in Table 1 .
Empirical Tests: The Capital-Labor Decision and Financial Constraints
Theoretical Hypothesis and Econometric Strategy
Results 1 and 2 suggest that constrained entrepreneurs will make relatively greater use of labor in production while unconstrained entrepreneurs will rely more heavily on capital. To test this hypothesis, we estimate the following equation:
where capital to labor ratio i is set equal to log 1 + value of assets i number of employees i , f inancially constrained i is a proxy for the probability that an entrepreneur is constrained, controls i is a vector of controls containing firm and owner attributes and i is an error term. The implication of Results 1 and 2 is that β < 0: financially constrained firms have lower capital-labor ratios.
The NSSBF data set of small firms is appropriate for testing the theory because the issues highlighted in the model, in particular individual employee contributions that have a significant effect on firm-wide outcomes, the large risk of bankruptcy and asymmetric information about the firm's financial status and quality, are most germane in smaller firms.
Instruments for Financial Constraints
Estimating (8) requires a reasonable proxy for the probability f inancially constrained i that a given firm i is financially constrained. A clear indication of financially constrained status is that a firm's loan application is denied, and we use loan application denial as our measure of f inancially constrained. Loan application denials are only informative about firms that make a loan application, so we restrict our data to the 952 firms that made applications (and that meet the data requirements described earlier).
It is reasonable to consider that firms with small capital-labor ratios may have very few assets with which to secure a loan, and that this lack of collateral may cause their loan applications to be denied, rather than the converse. That is, the relationship between a loan denial (i.e., f inancially constrained) and a low capital-labor ratio may be endogenous. We will therefore provide instruments for loan denial and use these instruments as measures of financial constraints. 9 We propose the following eight instruments for whether a firm has its loan application denied: firm presence in a concentrated local banking market, the entrepreneur's home equity and other wealth, the entrepreneur's education level, gender and African-American or Hispanic ethnicity and the firm's Dun and Bradstreet credit score. The rationale for these instruments is as follows. Concentrated banking markets, small entrepreneurial wealth (and hence little collateral), low education level, female and minority status and poor firm credit ratings are all variables that may plausibly make it more likely that an entrepreneurial applicant will be denied a loan. On the other hand, we presume that these variables will not have a direct effect on firm capital-labor ratios. 10 We assume, for example, that in the absence of financial constraints, African-American entrepreneurs would not choose capital-labor ratios that differ systematically from those of other entrepreneurs.
In the main model we presumed that the entrepreneur's financial status was public information, and that is a reasonable description of the following instruments: local banking market concentration, entrepreneur education, gender and ethnicity, and firm credit score. The entrepreneur's home equity and other wealth are less easily observed. In Section 3.3.3 we argue that the results in the model are robust to assuming that workers can learn the entrepreneur's financial status after being employed for some time. Therefore, all we need to assume is that workers can learn about the entrepreneur's home equity and other wealth in the course of their employment. 11
Our central strategy will be to estimate a 2SLS (two-stage least squares) regression in which the first stage equation is given by
where f inancially constrained i is a binary variable set equal to one if the firm was denied a loan, F is a linear function, instruments i is a vector of the eight instruments described above, controls i is a vector of controls containing firm and owner attributes and ν i is an error term. The second stage equation is (8). That is, even though our first stage dependent variable is binary, we estimate 2SLS using a linear form in the first state, as recommended by Angrist (2000) . We estimate (8) and (9) via a cross-sectional 2SLS regression that assumes that errors are independent across firms but potentially heteroskedastic.
To simply evaluate the appropriateness of the instruments, without estimating the full 2SLS, we also consider a logistic form for F , which reflects the binary nature of f inancially constrained. 10 In the model, unconstrained entrepreneurs have limitless cash, so even if, for example, the cost of borrowing is higher in more concentrated banking markets, unconstrained entrepreneurs can simply buy physical capital outright and bypass the banking market. As a result, local banking market competition will not have an effect on the capital-labor ratio of unconstrained entrepreneurs.
11 Workers will learn where the owner lives, what car he drives, where he vacations, etc. As Section 3.3.3 makes clear, Results 1 and 2 are also robust to assuming that financial status is unobservable, but Results 3 and 4 require that workers know something about the firm's financial status after having been employed for a period.
A second potential proxy for f inancially constrained that we do not utilize is an indicator for whether or not the firm made any loan applications in the last three years. We do not make use of this proxy because not applying for a loan may indicate either constrained status or unconstrained status or neither:
• Constrained firms may be so unlikely to receive financing that they are discouraged from applying. In this case, not having applied for a loan would be associated with constrained status.
• Unconstrained firms may have sufficient internal capital or long-term loans such that they need not apply for new debt. In this case, it is the unconstrained firms that do not apply.
• It may also be that filing a loan application is relatively low cost, so that it is done by both constrained and unconstrained firms.
Testing the Instruments
We begin by evaluating whether the instruments are associated with our measure of financial constraints. In the first column of Table 2 we report results from regressing a dummy variable for whether the firm's most recent loan application was rejected on the instruments and a set of controls. The controls with reported coefficients are log of one plus sales, log of one plus firm age, profit margin and an indicator for firm location in an MSA. Additional controls with coefficients unreported for brevity include a constant, industry dummies at the 2-digit SIC level, census region dummies, the log of one plus the owner's experience in managing a business, the log of the owner's age, the ownership share of the primary owner, a dummy for whether the firm is managed by the owner, a dummy for firms with zero sales in the previous year, a dummy for new firms, a dummy for firms subject to corporate income tax and a dummy for family-owned firms. The estimation is via binary logistic regression (Logit), with t-statistics reported in parentheses using robust "sandwich" (White) standard errors.
We find that several instruments enter equation (9) with statistically significant coefficients.
Firms are significantly (t = 2.36) more likely to be denied a loan in concentrated local banking markets. 12 Owners with less home equity (t = −3.08) and other wealth (t = −2.07), African Americans (t = 5.58) and Hispanics (t = 2.98) are all significantly more likely to have their loan applications rejected. Firms with better Dun and Bradstreet credit scores are also weakly (t = −1.94) more likely to receive a loan. Entrepreneur education and gender do not have a significant effect on loan denials. Taken together, however, the results in the first column of Table   2 support the use of the proposed instruments.
Empirical Findings: Capital-Labor Ratios and Financial Constraints
Results 1 and 2 imply that financially constrained firms will have low capital-labor ratios, and we test this hypothesis by estimating (8) and (9) via 2SLS. In column two of Table 2 we report results from the 2SLS regression of capital-labor ratios on whether the most recent loan was declined. We make use of the eight instruments and all the controls previously described in Section 4.2.3. (The NSSBF does not provide detailed firm locations or physical capital or labor market variables, so the regressions do not include prices of physical capital or labor.) We find that financially constrained firms (i.e., those whose loan applications were declined) have substantially reduced capital-labor ratios, as predicted by Results 1 and 2. The t-statistic on loan denial is -3.93 (calculated with robust standard errors). 13 For a given firm, an increase from zero to one in its probability of having a loan declined decreases its capital-labor ratio by 23.6 percent of the mean.
Given that we have eight instruments and only one endogenous variable, we conduct a heteroskedasticityrobust test of overidentifying restrictions (Wooldridge, 2002, p.123) . This test assesses whether the proposed instruments are actually exogenous. We find a p-value of 0.41, suggesting no reason to reject the validity of the instruments.
In the third column of Table 2 we report results from repeating the previous regression, but making use of only the following three instruments: local banking market concentration, the log of the owner's home equity and the log of the owner's net worth, because these are perhaps the most closely linked to the idea of financial constraints described in the theoretical model. The t-statistic on loan denial is -3.15 in this specification, and the p-value for the overidentifying restrictions is 0.68.
The idea underlying Results 1 and 2 that employees are quicker to learn firm quality than suppliers of physical capital is likely most important for young firms. For older firms, input suppliers face less of an asymmetric information problem, so learning may be less important. To test this idea, we create subsamples of young (firm age less than or equal to 11) and old (firm age above 11) firms and repeat the eight-instrument 2SLS regression in each subsample. (The median firm age is 11.) The results, displayed in columns 4 and 5 of Table 2 show that the coefficient on loan denial is significant (t=-3.58) in the young firms subsample but insignificant (t=-1.22) in the old firms subsample. This is consistent with the argument of the model that constrained firms' lower capital-labor ratios are driven by the informational advantage of labor.
Robustness Tests: The Capital-Labor Ratio and Financial Constraints
As a robustness check for the results described in Section 4.2.4, we estimate (8) via OLS using the instruments as proxies for f inancially constrained. This is not a formal 2SLS test, but it provides information on the effects of the different instruments on capital-labor ratios. If an instrument for financially constrained status was associated with higher capital-labor ratios, this would be a cause for concern. In the sixth column of Table 2 we report results from regressing capital-labor ratios on the eight instruments directly, and we include all the previous controls. Firms whose owners have more home equity (t = 2.70) and net wealth (t = 2.01) and firms with high credit scores (t = 1. Table 2 show that lower home equity, lower net wealth, lower firm credit scores, higher banking market concentration and African-American and Hispanic status of owners and are all associated with financial constraints (loan denials), and we find that the first five of these variables are also linked in a statistically significant manner to lower capital-labor ratios, while the sixth exhibits an insignificant correlation. Overall, this provides broad support for the argument that the empirical effect of financial constraints on capital-labor ratios is consistent across instruments.
As an additional test, we drop all observations for which the capital-labor ratio is above its 95th percentile or below its 5th percentile and find that this screening has essentially no effect on any of the regressions in Table 2 . 14
Robustness Tests: The Labor Intensity of Production and Financial Constraints
Results 1 and 2 have a direct implication for the relative capital-labor ratios of constrained firms, but they also have the more general implication that financially restricted firms will produce in a labor-intensive manner. In the model, the total cost of conducting business is the payment to the input supplier, so the theory predicts that the costs per employee will be lower in constrained firms as they hire more workers and use less physical capital. To test this broader implication, we relate the total costs of conducting business per employee to a firm's financial status. Specifically, we estimate the following equation:
where y i is set equal to log 1 + total costs i number of employees i , f inancially constrained i and controls i are defined as in (8) and Σ i is an error term. The total cost of conducting business includes rental costs on production facilities, the costs of all materials and interest payments on purchased capital, so this specification allows for the possibility that constrained firms may make greater use of operating leases or purchase (rather than produce) materials. All these costs are incorporated in log 1 + total costs i number of employees i , which is a measure of the labor intensity of production that thus controls for varying leasing or outsourcing strategies by different firms. (The NSSBF does not provide data on the total wage bill of the firm.) The implication of Results 1 and 2 is that ∆ < 0: financially constrained firms have lower total costs-labor ratios. We jointly estimate (9) and (10) using 2SLS.
In column one of Table 3 we report results from the 2SLS regression of total cost-labor ratios on our measure of financial constraints (i.e., whether the most recent loan was declined). We make use of the eight instruments and all the controls previously described in Section 4.2.3, with the exception of the profit margin, since the total costs are used to compute the profit margin. The four firms with zero costs are excluded. We find that financially constrained firms have significantly (t=-3.68) lower total cost-labor ratios, as predicted by Results 1 and 2. For a given firm, an increase from zero to one in its probability of having a loan declined decreases its total costs-labor ratio by 9.6 percent of the mean. The p-value for the overidentifying restrictions is 0.80. Column two of Table 3 details the results from the running the same regression but making use of only local banking market concentration, the log of the owner's home equity and the log of the owner's net worth as the instruments in Equation (9). We find similar results, with a negative and significant coefficient on financial constraints (t=-2.16) and an overidentifying restrictions p-value of 0.21.
We next consider the relationship between a firm's financial status, the number of its employees and its depreciable, depletable and intangible assets. (For simplicity, we refer to the latter class of assets, which are treated as a group in the NSSBF, simply as the firm's depreciable assets.)
As a second test of the effects of financial constraints on the labor-intensity of production, we estimate (10), setting y i equal to log 1 + depreciable assets i number of employees i . Depreciable assets may be more likely substitutes for labor than other assets such as land or cash. As above, the implication of Results 1 and 2 is that ∆ < 0. We jointly estimate (9) and (10) using 2SLS.
In column three of Table 3 we report results from the 2SLS regression of depreciable asset-labor ratios on our measure of financial constraints. We utilize the eight instruments and all the controls previously described in Section 4.2.3. The one firm with negative depreciable assets is excluded.
We find that financially constrained firms have significantly (t=-2.60) lower depreciable assets-labor ratios, as predicted by the model. For a given firm, an increase from zero to one in its probability of having a loan declined decreases its total depreciable assets-labor ratio by 38.1 percent of the mean. The p-value for the overidentifying restrictions is 0.26. As shown in column four of Table   3 , the results from the regression using only local banking market concentration, the log of the owner's home equity and the log of the owner's net worth are again consistent with the previous finding. We find a t-statistic of -2.37 on our measure of financial constraints, and the overidentifying restrictions p-value is 0.21. Tables 2 and 3 thus together provide a variety of evidence in favor of the prediction of Results 1 and 2 linking financial constraints to lower capital-labor ratios and to greater labor-intensity of production, more broadly.
The empirical findings in
Empirical Tests: Firm Productivity Growth and Financial Constraints
Theoretical Hypothesis and Econometric Strategy
Result 4 predicts that constrained firms will experience slower productivity growth than unconstrained firms, controlling for the level of physical capital and number of employees in the firm. To test this prediction, we estimate the following productivity equation: log(sales i ) = (11)
where sales i is the dollar value of firm i's sales, f irm age i is the age of firm i in years, f irm productivity controls i is an augmented vector of firm and entrepreneur attributes and u i is an error term. The implication of Result 4 is that ρ < 0: the relative productivity of constrained firms decreases over time.
We include in f irm productivity controls both the log of one plus assets and the log of employees interacted with industry dummies, and measures of firm assets in different categories (e.g. cash, land, inventory, etc.) This approach presumes that factor shares are constant within industries (Kahn and Lim, 1998), and we control for the use of different asset types by different firms. Our accounting for asset levels and types helps to ensure that our productivity results are not driven by different levels of capital investment in constrained firms.
The results in columns four and five of Table 2 indicate that the learning problems faced by input suppliers that are at the heart of the theoretical model are, as might be expected, most salient for young firms. This suggests that the decreasing relative productivity of constrained firms is likeliest to be found in the sample of younger firms. As firms age, information asymmetries become less relevant, the assumptions underlying the model will gradually fail to obtain and the difference between the productivities of constrained and unconstrained firms will begin to narrow.
Consequently, we separate the samples of old and young firm in our productivity analysis.
Ideally, we would test Result 4 by utilizing a panel data set allowing time-varying productivity estimates for given firms over time, but the NSSBF data does not provide the historical data required for that strategy. Instead, as described in (11), we estimate productivity for a crosssection of firms and analyze the interaction between financially constrained status and firm age.
Labor Productivity versus Total Factor Productivity
Strictly speaking, Result 4 concerns labor productivity, not general productivity, so we interpret the coefficients on financially constrained status and its interaction with firm age as labor productivity effects of these variables. This follows the literature on labor productivity (e.g. Freeman and Kleiner, 2000 and Lynch, 2001) . As in any Cobb-Douglas type specification, however, in (11) we are actually estimating total factor productivity, so it might be argued that any productivity differences we find between financially constrained and unconstrained firms actually arise from differences in asset productivity. Against this point we note that we measure assets in dollar terms and control for the various types of assets used by the firm. It seems unlikely that the productivity per dollar of assets varies widely within an industry, controlling for level of assets and asset type.
Moreover, the prediction of Result 4 is that the relative productivity of constrained firms will fall over time. This interaction result would not be generated by any difference between the productivity of assets in constrained and unconstrained firms that is constant over time. 15 Result 4 is distinctive in that it predicts a time series effect on the relative productivity of constrained firms.
Instrumental Variables
To estimate (11) we require a proxy for f inancially constrained. We do not make direct use of the indicator for whether a firm's loan application is denied, because this variable is endogenous is this setting as well; it may be that older firms are only denied a loan if they are especially unproductive.
The analysis is somewhat complicated by the fact that both financially constrained status and the interaction between constrained status and firm age are endogenous. That implies that we must instrument for both variables using a form of non-linear 2SLS.
We adopt the approach suggested in Angrist (2000) and Kelejian (1971) for non-linear 2SLS.
Specifically, we first estimate
where f inancially constrained i is a binary variable set equal to one if the firm was denied a loan, G takes the logistic form, instruments i is the vector of the eight original instruments described in Section 4.2.2 and ω i is an error term. We denote the predicted value of f inancially constrained generated by the estimation of (12) byf c.
We use this predicted variable to construct two new instruments ninstruments:f c andf c * log(1 + f irm age). The variables ninstuments are used as instruments for financially constrained status and the interaction between financially constrained status and the log of firm age. We use ninstruments to perform 2SLS. The first stage equations are
where Γ is a matrix of coefficients to be estimated and v i is a vector of error terms. The second stage equation is given by (11). We estimate (11) and (13) via a cross-sectional 2SLS that assumes independent but potentially heteroskedastic errors across firms.
Empirical Findings: Firm Productivity and Financial Constraints
We begin by analyzing the effects of financial constraints on productivity in the sample of older firms. In the first column of Table 4 we report results from the regression of the log of sales on financially constrained status, the interaction of financially constrained status and the log of one plus the firm age, the log of one plus the firm age and the set of firm productivity controls. The firm productivity controls include all the variables used in the regressions in Table 2 (detailed in Section 4.2.3) and also include the log of one plus assets and the log of employees interacted with industry dummies, and the log of one plus the asset type for the following eight asset categories:
cash, accounts receivable, inventory, other current assets, other investments, land, buildings plus equipment and other assets. As an additional control, we use the geographic size of the firm's market (measured on a 1-5 scale); this is designed to capture productivity differences between exporters and non-exporters. The estimation is via 2SLS, using the two new instruments generated by the eight original instruments, as described in Section 4.3.3, with robust t-statistics.
The results in the first column of Table 4 show that in the sample of older firms, the estimated coefficient on the interaction between financial constraints (i.e., loan denial) and firm age is negative but insignificant. In the second column of Table 4 , we report results from conducting the same regression on the sample of younger firms. For the set of younger firms, the coefficient on the interaction is negative and significant (t=-2.12), as predicted by Result 4. 16 The estimated coefficients indicate that an increase from zero to one in the probability of having a loan declined raises the log of sales by 0.7% of the mean for one-year-old firms, but lowers it by 8.0% of the mean for eleven-year-old firms, controlling for the level of assets and number of employees in the firm. As suggested by Result 4, within the group of firms for which information asymmetries are important, financial constraints are a greater disadvantage as firms age.
We also conduct these regressions exploiting only local banking market concentration, the log of the owner's home equity and the log of the owner's net worth as the instruments utilized in equation (12) to generate the two new instruments ninstruments. The results, shown in columns three and four of Table 4 confirm our previous findings. The interaction between financial constraints and firm age is insignificant in the older firms sample, and negative and significant (t=-2.31) in the younger firms sample. Dropping observations for which sales is above its 95th percentile or below its 5th percentile has only a minor effect on the coefficient estimates and does not change the statistical inference for any of the regressions in Table 4 . 17
The results in Table 4 indicate that firm age has no significant effect on productivity for older firms of either the constrained or unconstrained types. Unconstrained younger firms, however, experience significant positive productivity improvements over time, while constrained younger firms do not experience any significant change. This finding is consistent with the mechanism in the model by which unconstrained firms can improve their productivity by firing poor employees and hiring new ones who are better on average, while constrained firms retain their existing workers and maintain a fairly stable level of productivity over time. The empirical results described in Table   4 , particularly those for young entrepreneurial firms, thus provide support for Result 4.
Empirical Tests: Firm-Specific Investments and Financial Constraints
In this section we provide tests of Result 3.
Data
Our data source for the tests of Result 3 is the 1996-1997 National Organizations Survey (Kalleberg, Knoke and Marsden, 1996-1997) . The National Organizations Survey (NOS) gathers data from U.S.
work establishments on their formal structures, internal labor markets and use of hierarchies. There are 1002 organizations in the data set. We make use of two variables in the NOS on organizational practices. The first is a dummy variable indicating whether employees in the firm are involved in work teams when they do their job. The second is a summary measure of the average level at which decision are made within the firm. To construct the second variable we make use of data in NOS that describes who within the firm makes the final decision in the following eight areas:
new employee hiring, the use of subcontractors, the use of temporary workers, worker evaluation, product or service improvement, worker schedules, production targets and the provision of training programs. For each area the respondent indicates if the decision is made by the head of the organization (to which we assign a score of four), a middle manager (three), a supervisor (two) or someone below (one). For each firm we then average the scores across all the areas for which data is available to generate the summary measure.
The NOS includes location data which enables us to calculate the commercial bank deposit
Herfindahl of the organization's MSA (if it is in an MSA) or county (otherwise) in 1996. The owner demographic and credit score variables we employed in Table 2 are not available in the NOS data.
We restrict attention to organizations that are small firms. Our requirements that organizations have 500 or fewer employers, have for-profit status and provide the necessary organizational data are met by 241 firms in the data set.
Theoretical Hypotheses and Econometric Strategy
Result 3 shows that a worker will be more willing to make a firm-specific investment in a constrained firm than in an unconstrained firm. In order to generate empirical implications from Result 3, we must make the idea of a firm-specific investment concrete. In a previous draft (available from the author) we considered two examples of firm-specific investments: workers investing in cospecialization with fellow employees and workers choosing projects that generated firm-wide benefits at some personal cost. Our analysis of both these particular examples was driven by the intuition underlying Result 3 that employees in constrained firms are more willing to make firm-specific investments. We showed that constrained firms are more likely to produce in teams, because workers in constrained firms are more willing to make the co-specialization efforts that make team production efficient. We also showed that constrained entrepreneurs are more willing to grant their employees discretion in project selection, as employees in these firms are more likely to choose projects that generate firm-wide benefits, even at some personal cost. 18
This suggests two empirical implications of Result 3; firms owned by constrained entrepreneurs should more frequently produce in groups and should be more likely to grant their employees significant autonomy (i.e., allow decisions to be made at a lower level). To test these implication, we estimate the following equation:
where z i is a description of an organizational practice (production in teams or level at which decisions are made), f inancially constrained i is proxied for by the local commercial bank deposit Herfindahl, controls i is a set of firm-level controls and η i is an error term. We estimate (14) via cross-sectional Logit (for the binary team-production variable) and OLS (for the decision-level variable), assuming that errors are independent across firms but potentially heteroskedastic.
Empirical Findings: Firm-Specific Investments and Financial Constraints
We analyze a logit regression of a dummy variable indicating whether employees in the firm are involved in work teams on the concentration of the local banking market and controls for the number of employees, sales, age and industry (at the 2-digit SIC level). Consistent with the first implication of Result 3, we find that firms located in concentrated banking markets are significantly more likely to have their core employees involved in work teams (t=2.59). A one-standard-deviation increase in banking concentration increases the probability of work teams by 6.6% when the other variables are evaluated at their medians.
We also regress via OLS the average level at which decisions are made on banking concentration and the controls described above. We find, consistent with Result 3, a significant negative coefficient (t=-2.35) on banking concentration. A one-standard-deviation increase in bank concentration reduces the level at which decisions are made by 2.2% of the mean.
These findings from the NOS data utilize only one proxy for financial constraints and draw on a relatively small data set. The results, nonetheless, provide some empirical support for Result 3 and indicate that it has several clearly testable implications.
Conclusion
In this paper we develop a model of the optimal capital and labor management strategies of financially constrained and unconstrained firms. We argue that workers are better informed than suppliers of physical capital, and therefore employees, but not capital providers, have the real option to abandon unsuccessful firms. As a result, employees are willing to work for firms without advance payments, while capital suppliers are not, and constrained firms (that cannot offer initial payments)
consequently will have lower capital-labor ratios. We also demonstrate that successful constrained firms find it difficult to hire new employees and thus offer an implicit retention guarantee to their workers. As a result, employees in these firms will be likelier to make firm-specific investments.
We further show that constrained firms will exhibit declining relative labor productivity over time.
Empirical tests confirm the central predictions of the model and indicate that a firm's use of labor as an input in production can be affected considerably by the extent of its financial resources.
An interesting implication of the model is that firms that undergo a shift in their financial status will simultaneously alter their labor policies. For example, the advent of new sizable venture capital or bank financing may discourage employees from making firm-specific investments. In such a setting, encouraging employee initiative becomes less important, which should lead the firm to institute a more formal hierarchy structure that concentrates decision-making power in the hands of senior managers. This may lead to a "professionalization" (Hellman and Puri (2002)) of the way the firm conducts business that derives simply from the firm's new access to financing and that is independent of any actions or guidance on the part of the source of capital. Similarly, post-IPO firms should experience a significant change in their employee retention policies.
We conclude that no supplier of capital will be willing to provide capital to the constrained entrepreneur in the first period. We now show that condition (4) is necessary for the existence of an equilibrium in which financially constrained entrepreneurs hire labor. If in equilibrium labor is hired by the constrained entrepreneur in the first period, the worker will quit if
We denote the probability that new labor can be hired without any advance cost by p l . The entrepreneur will fire the worker if
Separation thus occurs for
where the equality is a definition and D 1 is a decreasing function. We thus have
As above, this shows that after separation no new labor will be supplied to the constrained entrepreneur. Since no new labor can be hired in period two, the first period worker will remain with the constrained firm if and only if θ(q + f ) ≥ (i.e. if it is in his own interest to do so). The two period expected payoff to a worker hired by a constrained entrepreneur in the first period is
it is an equilibrium for a worker to join the firm in period 1, quit if θ(q+f ) < and remain otherwise. The entrepreneur never fires the worker. All off-equilibrium path actions from the entrepreneur are assumed to come from entrepreneurs with f = f min in the second period. Condition (17) is thus necessary and sufficient for the existence of an equilibrium in which labor is hired, since if it fails the worker will not agree to join the firm and if it holds he will. Proof of Result 2.
To prove the result we will exhibit a set of equilibria in which the unconstrained entrepreneur produces using capital and a second set of equilibria in which he produces using labor. All references to an entrepreneur below are to an unconstrained entrepreneur. First, we describe an equilibrium in which the entrepreneur produces using capital. We assumē
and
These assumptions guarantee that capital is productive relative to labor (18) and not too expensive (19). We propose the following candidate equilibrium. Entrepreneurs hire capital in the first period and keep it if and only if r ≥r. Otherwise, the existing capital is sold and new capital is purchased. All off-equilibrium path bids from the entrepreneur are assumed to come from entrepreneurs with f = f min and employees (who are never hired in equilibrium) expect not to be retained. We now confirm that the above describes an equilibrium. Assumptions (18) and (19) show that r − ζ ≥q − , so hiring labor in the first round and then buying capital is dominated by buying capital in both rounds. Given the off-equilibrium path beliefs about entrepreneurs who hire labor, a similar argument shows that if capital was hired in the first period, buying new capital is superior to hiring new labor in the second period. The off-equilibrium path beliefs also make buying capital always cheaper than renting it. Condition (18) shows that the entrepreneur does better to follow his equilibrium strategy rather than not producing. We last consider the strategy of using labor in both periods. The expected first-period payoff from this strategy is (1 − θ)(f +q). If labor is retained and θ(f + q) > , then no retention payment is needed. If (f + q) ∈ [ , θ ), a retention payment of k l = − θ(f + q) will be required. The entrepreneur will never retain the labor if (f + q) < , since he could only do so at a loss. This gives a net payoff to the entrepreneur choosing retention of
If the entrepreneur hires new labor, the off-equilibrium beliefs imply that only signing payments s ≥ − θq − θf min will be accepted. The expected payoff from hiring new labor is (1 − θ)(f +q) − ( − θq − θf min ). The two-period expected payoff to the entrepreneur hiring labor is thus
where the last term is the expected payoff from following the candidate equilibrium strategy of using capital in both periods. The first inequality follows from (18) and (19), the third from (18), and the second and fourth follow from routine algebra. This verifies the candidate equilibrium. We now describe an equilibrium in which the entrepreneur produces using labor. The necessary conditions areq
Condition (22) 
otherwise new labor is hired (if the first argument of the maximum is larger) or the firm closes (if the second argument is larger). All off-equilibrium path bids are assumed to come from entrepreneurs with f = f min in the second period. The proof that this is an equilibrium is analogous to that given above for the physical capital equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 1. The entrepreneur at the end of the first period has potentially three actions from which to choose: 1. σ a -retain the employee:
2. σ b -fire the employee and hire a replacement:
where s is the signing payment. 3. σ c -fire the employee leave the position open:
The proof of Result 1 showed that E[f |separation] ≤f for the constrained entrepreneur, which implies that the labor market will demand a positive signing payment s > 0 for joining the firm at the end of the first period. The constrained entrepreneur cannot pay this amount, so σ b is unavailable to him. If θ(f +q) > , then σ a dominates σ c .
Proof of Result 3.
We define R to be the indicator function for the retention of the worker: R(f,q) = 1 if the worker is retained by the firm when firm productivity is given by f and end-of-first-period worker quality is given byq, and R(f,q) = 0 otherwise. R c and R u are the indicator functions for the constrained and unconstrained firms, respectively. The worker may always choose to quit and receive , so for a given firm-wide quality f and end-offirst-period worker qualityq, the expected second period payoff of a worker in a constrained firm is given by
The formula for W 2,u (f,q) is analogous, with unconstrained retention functions replacing the constrained ones above. The first statement in Result 3 is that if
then
First suppose that θ(e + q + λ) ≤ . This implies that W 2,u (e, q + λ) = = W 2,u (e, q), hence inequality (5) shows that (24) fails and the result holds. Now suppose that θ(e + q + λ) > . Lemma 1 shows that R 2,c (e, q + λ) = 1. We therefore have W 2,c (e, q + λ) = θ(e + q + λ) and W 2,u (e, q + λ) ≤ θ(e + q + λ). If θ(e + q) ≤ then W 2,c (e, q) = and W 2,u (e, q) = , (24) implies (25) and the result is proved. Suppose θ(e + q) > . This implies that
where the final inequality follows from (6). This shows that (25) holds. For the failure of the converse, consider the labor-hiring equilibrium described in the proof of Result
and θ(f + q) + 2θλ − g > then the worker makes a firm-specific investment in the constrained firm, but not in the unconstrained firm.
Proof of Result 4.
For any given f and first-period worker quality q, Result 3 shows that if firm-specific investment occurs in the unconstrained firm then it also occurs in the constrained firm. That shows that E π 1,c ≥ E π 1,u . We denote the expected second period worker match quality by q c and q u , for the constrained and unconstrained entrepreneurs, respectively. If first-period firm-specific investment occurs in either both the constrained and unconstrained firms or in neither, at the end of the first period the employee in both firm types has the same qualityq. As described in the proof of Lemma 1, the unconstrained entrepreneur has more second-period options from which to pick. The additional options involve making retention payments (σ a ) or signing payments (σ b ), so the unconstrained entrepreneur will only select them if q u ≥ q c (and, hence, π 2,u ≥ π 2,c ). Otherwise, the two entrepreneurs choose the same action and q u = q c and π 2,u = π 2,c . Table 1 reports means (all variables), medians and standard deviations (all non-binary variables) for each variable in the 1998 National Survey of Small Business Finance. Employees, assets, depreciable assets (including depletable and intangible assets), sales, total costs of conducting business, firm age, profit margin (profits divided by sales) and DBscore (Dun and Bradstreet credit score on a 1-5 scale) are measured at the firm level. Home equity, net worth (excluding the value of the firm and the value of home equity), education (on a 1-7 scale), gender and ethnicity are given for the firm's primary owner. MSA is a dummy for whether the firm is located in a Metropolitan Statistical Area, and Bank Herf Index is a measure (from 1 to 3) of the deposit concentration of the local MSA or county commercial bank market. Applied for a loan is a dummy for whether the firm made one or more loan applications in the past 3 years, and Applied for a loan and rejected is a dummy for whether the firm's most recent loan application (if any) was rejected. Results from the regressions of whether the firm had a loan application declined in the last 3 years (first column) and the log of one plus the ratio of assets to employees (second through sixth columns) on measures of financial constraints. The regressors with reported coefficients are an index of the local banking market Herfindahl measure, the log of one plus the firm owner's home equity, the log of one plus the owner's net worth excluding his home equity, a ranking of the firm owner's education, dummies for the firm owner being female, African-American or Hispanic, the firm's credit score as obtained from Dun and Bradstreet, the log of one plus annual sales, the log of one plus firm age, the firm's profits to sales ratio (profit margin), a dummy for the location of the firm within an MSA (Metropolitan Statistical Area) and an instrumented estimate of the probability of the firm's having a loan application declined. The instruments are the first eight variables listed for the regressions in columns two, four and five, and the first three variables listed for the regression in column three. Additional regressors with unreported coefficients include a constant, industry dummies at the 2-digit SIC level, census region dummies, the log of one plus the owner's experience in managing a business, the log of the owner's age, the ownership share of the primary owner, a dummy for owner-managed firms, a dummy for firms with zero sales in the previous year, a dummy for new firms (except column four), a dummy for firms subject to corporate income tax and a dummy for family-owned firms. The data source is the 1998 National Survey of Small Business Finance. The regressions are estimated via binary logistic regression (Logit), ordinary least squares (OLS), or two-stage least squares (2SLS), as described, with t-statistics reported in parentheses using robust standard errors. Reported R 2 for the Logit specification is McFadden's pseudo R 2 . Results from the regressions of the log of one plus the ratio of the total cost of conducting business to the number of employees (first and second columns) and the log of one plus the ratio of depreciable, depletable or intangible assets to employees (third and fourth columns) on measures of financial constraints. The regressors with reported coefficients are an instrumented estimate of the probability of the firm's having a loan application declined, the log of one plus annual sales, the log of one plus firm age, the firm's profits to sales ratio (profit margin) in columns one and three and a dummy for the location of the firm within an MSA (Metropolitan Statistical Area). The instruments are generated using an index of the local banking market Herfindahl measure, the log of one plus the firm owner's home equity, the log of one plus the owner's net worth excluding his home equity, a ranking of the firm owner's education, dummies for the firm owner being female, African-American or Hispanic and the firm's credit score as obtained from Dun and Bradstreet for the regressions in columns one and three, and are generated using the first three of these variables for the regressions in columns two and four. Additional regressors with coefficients unreported for brevity include a constant, industry dummies at the 2-digit SIC level, census region dummies, the log of one plus the owner's experience in managing a business, the log of the owner's age, the ownership share of the primary owner, a dummy for whether the firm is managed by the owner, a dummy for firms with zero sales in the previous year, a dummy for new firms, a dummy for firms subject to corporate income tax and a dummy for family-owned firms. The data source is the 1998 National Survey of Small Business Finance. The regressions are estimated via ordinary least squares (OLS) or two-stage least squares (2SLS), as described, with t-statistics reported in parentheses using robust standard errors.
*,** Indicates significance at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively. Results from the regressions of the log of annual sales on measures of financial constraints, interactions between financial constraints and firm age and firm inputs. The regressors with reported coefficients are an instrumented estimate of the probability of the firm's having a loan application declined, the interaction of the instrumented estimate with the log of one plus the firm age, the log of one plus the firm age and a dummy for the location of the firm within an MSA (Metropolitan Statistical Area). The instruments are generated using an index of the local banking market Herfindahl measure, the log of one plus the firm owner's home equity, the log of one plus the owner's net worth excluding his home equity, a ranking of the firm owner's education, dummies for the firm owner being female, African-American or Hispanic and the firm's credit score as obtained from Dun and Bradstreet for the regressions in columns one and two, and are generated using the first three of these variables for the regressions in columns three and four. Additional regressors with coefficients unreported for brevity include a constant, industry dummies at the 2-digit SIC level, industry dummies interacted with both the log of one plus assets and the log of employees, the log of one plus the asset type for the following eight asset categories: cash, accounts receivable, inventory, other current assets, other investments, land, buildings plus equipment and other assets, census region dummies, the log of one plus the owner's experience in managing a business, the log of the owner's age, the ownership share of the primary owner, a dummy for whether the firm is managed by the owner, a dummy for firms subject to corporate income tax, a dummy for family-owned firms and an index for the geographic size of the firm's market. The data source is the 1998 National Survey of Small Business Finance. The regressions are estimated via two-stage least squares (2SLS), with t-statistics reported in parentheses using robust standard errors.
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*,** Indicates significance at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively.
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The entrepreneur hires either labor or capital.
The entrepreneur and labor (if hired) view firm quality f and either labor match quality q or capital match quality r.
The entrepreneur may fire the supplier of labor or capital. The input supplier may also terminate the relationship.
If both parties choose to maintain the relationship, it continues into the second period. Otherwise, the entrepreneur may attempt to hire new capital or labor.
First period production ends and the output is divided.
Second period timing is analogous, with the exception that no arrangements are made for future production.
First period production begins.
t=0 t=1 t=2
Second period production begins.
The entrepreneur hires labor.
The entrepreneur and labor view firm quality f and labor match quality q.
The entrepreneur may fire the worker and the worker may quit.
If both parties choose to maintain the relationship, it continues into the second period. Otherwise, the entrepreneur may attempt to hire new labor.
The worker decides whether or not to make a firm-specific investment.
